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‘Swallow	the	lot,	and	swallow	it	now’:	Britain	is,	and
was,	deluded	about	its	negotiating	power	with	the
EU
Britain	is	making	the	same	mistake	about	the	EU	now	as	Harold	Macmillan	did	about	the
European	Community	in	the	1960s,	writes	Piers	Ludlow	(LSE).	Personal	appeals	to	Général
de	Gaulle	proved	fruitless.	The	EU27	are	unbending	–	not	because	they	bear	ill-will	towards
the	British	for	voting	to	leave,	but	because	the	nature	of	the	EU	demands	internal	unity.	Only	if
the	UK	makes	major	concessions	is	progress	likely	to	be	made.
Watching	the	stuttering	progress	of	the	Brexit	negotiations	as	a	historian	of	Britain	and	the
European	integration	process,	I	can’t	help	being	struck	by	a	depressing	sense	of	familiarity.		In	far	too	many
ways,	we’ve	been	here	before.		And	with	no	period	are	the	gloom-inducing	parallels	more	striking	than	with	the
UK’s	very	first	attempt	to	join	the	then	EEC,	back	in	the	early	1960s.
Then,	as	now,	the	negotiations	began	with	a	hopelessly	optimistic	assessment	of	how	long	it	would	take	to	agree
membership	terms.		When	Harold	Macmillan’s	government	applied	to	join	the	Community	in	the	summer	of	1961,
at	least	one	newspaper	confidently	predicted	‘certainty	by	Christmas’.		In	fact,	the	outcome	of	the	talks	was	still
hanging	in	the	balance	when	General	de	Gaulle	intervened	with	the	first	of	his	famous	vetoes	in	January	1963.	If
joining	the	comparatively	new	and	simple	Common	Market	of	the	early	1960s	proved	more	complex	and	difficult
than	most	had	foreseen,	how	much	more	unrealistic	are	those	who	expected	it	to	be	easy	to	disentangle	over	40
years	of	UK	membership	of	the	now	much	larger	EU,	with	its	vastly	wider	policy	remit?
In	1961	Britain	approached	the	fledgling	EEC	with	the	confident	expectation	that	the	six	member	states	would	be
so	glad	to	have	the	UK	join	them	that	the	negotiation	would	involve	extensive	give	and	take	on	both	sides.	A
degree	of	French	intransigence	was	expected,	it	is	true,	but	Macmillan	and	his	key	negotiator	Edward	Heath	were
confident	that	the	‘friendly	Five’	–	the	remaining	member	states	–	would	weigh	into	Community	discussions	on
Britain’s	behalf.	Instead,	the	UK	negotiators	watched	with	dismay	as	the	Six	bound	themselves	with	a	negotiating
procedure	designed	to	maximise	their	internal	unity	and	to	minimise	the	extent	to	which	the	applicant	could	play
upon	differences	of	view	within	the	EEC.		This	involved	far	more	extensive	discussions	amongst	themselves	–
negotiations	about	Britain,	rather	than	with	Britain	–	than	two-way	discussions	with	the	country	seeking	to	join.	
And	despite	repeated	attempts	by	British	diplomats	and	negotiators	to	play	upon	the	very	sincere	Anglophilia	(and
desire	for	British	membership)	felt	in	most	European	capitals	other	than	Paris,	this	unity	just	about	held	until	de
Gaulle’s	decisive	–	and	unilateral	–	intervention.
LSE Brexit: ‘Swallow the lot, and swallow it now’: Britain is, and was, deluded about its negotiating power with the EU Page 1 of 3
	
	
Date originally posted: 2017-11-09
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2017/11/09/swallow-the-lot-and-swallow-it-now-britain-is-and-was-deluded-about-its-negotiating-power-with-the-eu/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/
The	man	with	the	veto	…	de	Gaulle	in	Montreal,	1967.	Photo:	Archives	de	la	ville	de	Montréal
via	a	CC-BY-NC-SA	2.0	licence
This	unity	amongst	EEC	negotiators	was	built	around	a	determined	defence	of	the	Community	system	as	it	had
been	created,	and	as	it	might	develop.		Britain,	as	a	prospective	member	state,	would	be	allowed	some	special
adaptations	to	smooth	its	path	into	the	Community,	especially	with	regard	to	the	Commonwealth.	But	such
arrangements	would	be	temporary	only,	designed	to	lessen	the	shock	of	entry	but	not	intended	permanently	to
exempt	the	new	member	from	any	EEC	rules.	Britain	was	very	welcome	to	join	the	club,	in	other	words,	but	it	was
for	the	applicant	to	adapt	its	traditions,	trading	patterns,	and	global	links	to	the	Community,	not	vice	versa.	
The	EU27’s	insistence	that	a	departing	UK	should	not	be	allowed	to	cherry-pick	those	parts	of	the	EU’s	system
that	it	likes,	and	opt	out	of	those	it	does	not,	is	thus	wholly	in	line	with	the	stance	that	the	founder	members
adopted.
This	parallel	is	no	coincidence.	The	determined	defence	of	internal	unity	and	the	protection	of	what	has	been
agreed	amongst	the	members	is	a	defining	characteristic	of	the	EC/EU	as	an	international	negotiator.	Reaching
agreement	within	the	Community/Union	has	always	been	a	painstaking	–	even	painful	–	process.		But	once	it	has
been	attained,	none	of	the	members	has	any	interest	in	seeing	these	hard-won	bargains	being	reopened	at	the
behest	of	an	outsider,	even	one	regarded	as	a	friend.	This	became	crystal	clear	to	the	British	as	they	sought	to
join	in	the	1960s,	culminating	in	the	resigned	acceptance	by	Sir	Con	O’Neill,	the	chief	negotiator	at	official	level	in
1970-2,	who	commented	that	the	only	possible	British	approach	to	existing	Community	body	of	rules	was
‘Swallow	the	lot,	and	swallow	it	now’.[1]	But	it	was	also	a	lesson	learnt	by	the	Americans	during	much	the	same
period	as	they	tried,	and	failed,	to	modify	the	emerging	Common	Agricultural	Policy	(CAP),	and	as	they	tangled
with	the	Community	when	seeking	to	redefine	the	terms	of	world	trade	during	the	so-called	GATT	(General
Agreement	on	Tariffs	and	Trade)	Kennedy	Round.	One	American	diplomat	of	the	era	lamented	the	fact	that	the
Community	was	‘a	strongly-muscled,	leaden-footed	beast’.[2]
But	this	inflexibility	and	unwillingness	to	give	ground	did	not	reflect	ill-will	or	animosity	towards	either	Britain	or	the
US,	any	more	than	the	EU’s	current	rigidity	reflects	a	desire	to	punish	the	UK	for	voting	to	leave.		It	is	an
inevitable	result	of	the	way	in	which	a	complex	multilateral	entity	has	to	prioritise	the	needs	and	desires	of
insiders	over	and	above	those	of	outsiders,	however	well-liked.
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All	of	this	means	that	flights	of	fancy	about	the	Brexit	impasse	being	broken	by	a	well-timed	deal	struck	between
the	British	government	and	Angela	Merkel	and/or	Emmanuel	Macron	are	likely	to	be	every	bit	as	unrealistic	as
Macmillan’s	delusional	hopes	that	he	could	sort	out	the	painfully	slow	Brussels	negotiation	by	means	of	direct
personal	diplomacy	towards	General	de	Gaulle.		Huge	time	and	effort	was	put	into	the	three	de	Gaulle-Macmillan
summits	of	the	1961-2	period,	including	semi-serious	contemplation	of	some	type	of	nuclear	deal	involving	aid	to
France’s	putative	nuclear	deterrent	in	return	for	a	smooth	path	in	Brussels	–	but	no	real	bargain	was	ever	on	the
cards.		Nor	would	Harold	Wilson	prove	any	more	successful	in	his	personal	charm	offensive	towards	de	Gaulle	in
1966-1967.		And	even	Edward	Heath’s	seeming	breakthrough	with	Georges	Pompidou	in	May	1971	appears,
from	the	latest	historical	research,	to	have	been	a	largely	stage-managed	occasion,	at	which	the	two	leaders
made	public	a	substantive	narrowing	of	the	gap	between	the	French	and	British	positions	that	had	been	largely
secured	by	UK	concessions	on	several	key	controversies	on	which	the	Heath	membership	talks	centred.[3]	No
high-diplomatic	shortcut	is	likely	to	allow	the	UK	to	avoid	the	difficult	and	slow	negotiations	in	Brussels.
Instead,	getting	out	of	the	EU	seems	likely	to	require	the	same	readiness	to	give	ground	on	the	part	of	the
departing	country	as	most	countries	have	had	to	display	when	seeking	to	join	the	EC/EU.		If	the	UK	wants	a	deal,
it	is	likely	to	be	bought	through	British	concessions	and	the	abandonment	of	some	of	its	initial	negotiating	aims,
rather	than	large-scale	giveaways	by	the	EU27.		And	it	is	here	that	one	final	parallel	with	the	1961-3	negotiations
becomes	worrying.		Because	just	as	Macmillan’s	ability	to	make	the	concessions	needed	to	reach	a	breakthrough
in	Brussels	was	all	but	destroyed	by	growing	cabinet	splits	on	Europe,	dwindling	government	popularity	(1962
was	the	year	of	the	famous	Orpington	by-election)	and	by	a	Labour	opposition	increasingly	willing	to	seek	party-
political	advantage	through	opportunism	over	the	European	issue,	so	too	Theresa	May’s	scope	for	flexibility
seems	ever	more	circumscribed.
The	present	situation,	though,	is	much	more	uncomfortable	and	potentially	painful	than	that	of	1963.
The	implications	of	failure	are	far	greater.	Britain’s	inability	to	join	the	EEC	in	1963	was	a	hammer	blow	to
Macmillan’s	government	and	a	disappointment	to	many	on	both	sides	of	the	Channel.	But	ultimately	it	meant	no
more	than	a	temporary	prolongation	of	the	status	quo,	and	the	postponement	rather	than	the	end	of	the	UK’s
European	ambitions.		Failure	now	would	be	much	more	serious,	confronting	the	country	with	all	the	economic,
legal	and	political	consequences	of	a	cliff-edge	Brexit.		The	British	government	urgently	needs	to	stop
repeating	the	mistakes	of	its	predecessor	over	half	a	century	ago.		A	breakthrough	in	Brussels	is	a	national
necessity	–	even	if	achieving	it	requires	awkward	and	painful	climbdowns.
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